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Whither Deliberation?
Mass E-Mail Campaigns
and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking
Stuart W. Shulman

ABSTRACT. Mass e-mail campaigns are the organizational tool of
choice for environmental activists seeking to inform and mobilize their
constituencies. Some democratic theorists and reformers pin their hopes
for more responsive and informed government policy on Internet-enhanced dialogue and debate. Electronic advocacy campaigns and action
alerts are changing the nature and scope of public deliberation in contentious federal rulemaking. This paper examines the new digital landscape
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of electronic rulemaking through a case study of the recent mercury
rulemaking at the US Environmental Protection Agency. Results are presented from an effort to code a sample of 1,000 e-mails selected at random
from a dataset of approximately half a million. Particular attention is paid
to the unique additions made to form letters. doi:10.1300/J399v03n03_03
[Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com>
Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc.
All rights reserved.]
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that someone stood up at a professional meeting and said:
If only information technology had been used to facilitate online dialogue and deliberation with the ENEMY, Al Queda, prior to 9/11,
we might have resolved our differences. We might all have come
to better understand the other sides’ point of view. We might have
collaborated to find a better solution than mass murder.
If such a thing were said, the audience would probably would howl
and hiss in a manner not often seen at such meetings. This first argument
is simply not credible. If instead they said:
If only information technology could be better used to facilitate
online dialogue and deliberation with the ENEMY, (say, industry,
government, the environmentalists, Ralph Nader, or whomever)
we might have resolved our differences. We might all have come
to better understand the other sides’ point of view. We might have
collaborated to find a better solution than, say, allowing a suboptimal dose of mercury pollution into our nation’s air that may
ultimately harm or kill more people than died on September 11,
2001.
A few observers might endorse the second argument. Perhaps some
would call it democracy’s technological cutting edge (Berkman Center,
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2005; Noveck, 2004a; Froomkin, 2004; Blumler & Coleman, 2001).
That is, the potential in the United States for using information technology and Internet-enhanced participation in the “notice and comment”
stage of the regulatory rulemaking process to make it widely distributed, reflexive, transparent, information rich, asynchronous, low-cost,
less adversarial, and more meaningful (GAO, 2005; Bimber, 2003;
Brandon & Carlitz, 2002; Johnson, 1998). Others more broadly hope
for online democratic systems less encumbered by the exercise of
power, intimidation, deception, single-mindedness, and other forms of
even more commonplace speech-treachery (Parker, 2005; Beierle, 2003;
Carlitz & Gunn, 2002; Coleman & Gøtze, 2001; Dahlberg, 2001).
It is only partly ridiculous to compare the dynamics of Jihadist zealotry with the behavior of sometimes visibly desperate actors in U.S. regulatory rulemaking. The passion to win, and for many the accumulated
experiences of repeatedly losing, in an intensely adversarial and political environment has left significant numbers of citizen participants in a
state of mind in which they are more likely to eviscerate or humiliate
than deliberate. Online participation in U.S. rulemaking, at least for the
foreseeable future, is no more likely to transform how the average citizen helps make regulatory decisions in the United States than it is to resolve the many issues underlying our current war on terror. While the
potential for more meaningful forms of online deliberation is there
(Shane, 2005; Stanley et al., 2004), for most participants in the heavytraffic U.S. rulemakings, it is latent and undeveloped.
Optimists argue that online deliberation will indeed be transformative someday, but only when it is structured appropriately by the right
people (Noveck, 2004b; OECD, 2003). I remain less sanguine, however, based on the state of the art in electronic rulemaking, current
trends in e-advocacy, and because agreeing upon the “right people” is
terribly difficult (Shulman, 2004, 2005). Furthermore, in the specific
domain of mass participation in environmental rulemaking, it is quite
possible that e-mail campaigns are another indicator of the “Death of
Environmentalism,” in which the mechanistic sustenance of the movement supersedes the type of thinking and action needed for the actual
saving of the planet (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005; Emery & Emery,
2005). At the very least, the domain of e-mail and cyberspace more generally is better known for flourishes of incivility rather than any widespread, technologically-driven transformation of passive citizens into
thoughtful, deliberative, and engaged actors.
These cautious observations grow out of almost five years of work on
what became two related but distinct National Science Foundation
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(NSF)-funded projects. The first began with discovery of the National
Organic Program rulemaking public comment data online (Shulman,
2003). In that instance, the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) received approximately 277,000 comments on their initial proposed standard for the term “organic.” Of those comments, more than
20,000 were submitted via a Web form set up ad hoc by mid-level
USDA personnel for a 90-day comment period. Respondents using this
online interface had the option to see comments that had already been
submitted, no matter whether they came by the Web, fax, or postal mail,
and to enter their own comments via a Web form.
In early 1998 it was a substantial innovation at USDA to allow online
commenters anywhere in the world a chance to see the comments. The
organic rule writers, managers, and technicians interviewed in 2000 and
again in 2003 reported that this “open docket” design resulted in a significant number of comments on other peoples’ comments, which was
suggestive of nascent, large-scale, online dialogue and deliberation in
federal rulemaking. Intrigued by this possibility, a group was formed to
investigate whether this was part of a turn to deliberative democratic
practices facilitated by the birth of e-rulemaking (Shulman et al., 2003).
In the first project, under the direction of David Schlosberg, a political theorist at Northern Arizona University, we are systematically looking for indicators of deliberation in a set of rulemakings in which the
presence of an online open docket and a controversial environmental
issue created at least the possibility for some degree of online deliberation amongst commenters with divergent points of view. In 2003 and
2004, a total of 10 undergraduates at two universities (Drake University
and University of San Francisco) were professionally trained in twoday seminars to code a large, random sample of public comments from
three rulemakings where the presence of an open docket created the possibility for deliberation.
Specifically, we were looking for signs in the text submitted that commenters had read other comments, or had otherwise demonstrated behavior that theorists of deliberative democracy call desirable. Therefore,
we looked for signs of deliberation instead of preference aggregation,
inclusion of difference, respect for a variety of positions, transformation
of preferences, as well as expanding and authentic discourse. To date,
there is very little evidence that the actual public comment text submitted meets any of our deliberative thresholds. Despite the presence of an
online open docket, the technology itself fails to render commenters
more deliberative.
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These early findings from this textual analysis stand in contrast with
the self-reported deliberative behavior of a majority of respondents in a
large-scale (1,553 respondents) telephone survey of commenters on
these same rules (Schlosberg et al., 2005). It may suffice to say for now
that the specific barriers to better online deliberation, at least in U.S.
regulatory rulemaking, are less technical than social, political, legal,
and architectural in nature.
In the other project, with a pair of computer science colleagues, we
are developing and testing the efficacy of new information retrieval
tools tailored to the rulemaking environment (Shulman et al., 2004,
2005a). As part of this project, we convened a series of workshops, interviews, and focus groups annually for four years with governmental
and non-governmental stakeholders involved in regulatory rulemaking.
At the most recent of these workshops, we demonstrated the state of the
art in our research and development of algorithms that can, among other
things, quickly and efficiently identify duplicate electronic form letters
and unique text added to near-duplicate comments, and then we ask
how the availability of these and other advanced language processing
tools might impact the rulemaking process (Shulman, 2004).
The reason we do this is that agency personnel have repeatedly told
us that the emergence of first generation electronic rulemaking has
had the singular effect of increasing the flood of duplicative, often insubstantial, mass mailing campaigns (Shulman et al., 2005b). These
campaigns exist for many legitimate reasons, politically and organizationally speaking. However, they do little to move administrative rulemaking toward the ideal of enlightened online deliberation and they do
much to try and swing the pendulum away from administrative expertise and toward plebiscitary, direct democracy via electronic preference
aggregation. This terrifies administrative law scholars and practitioners
in the U.S. civil service as the “overall trend has been away from the
expertise model and toward the politics model,” as the comments submitted increase by orders of magnitude (Lubbers, 2003: 149-150). It
also fails to move the process to a higher deliberative plane.
So, where is this heading? Interest groups contract with a thriving eadvocacy sub-sector of the Washington, DC economy and routinely set
up clusters of Web action centers. The prevailing system generates voluminous quantities of mass e-mail comments. One firm (Capitol Advantage, see http://capitoladvantage.com) promoted itself in 2004 with
a counter on their home page claiming credit for more than 16 million
constituent messages that year. This brain-numbing quantity of duplicative e-mails leaves practitioners in federal agencies (or more commonly
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private contractors) sorting e-mails with mounting congressional and
executive demands for efficiency and effectiveness and a highly charged,
adversarial political and ideological backdrop. Considering that billions
of dollars and the nature of life on earth are at stake, the fact is that the
deliberative democratic future of regulatory rulemaking looks bleak.
These machinations occur, in part, for reasons that have little to do
with improving the final rule. While a Capitol Advantage service like
“CapWiz” offers customers the technical ability to efficiently deliver a
large number of messages that are “on time, on target, and on point,”
there is more than simply effective communication at stake. Modern
data mining and outreach techniques mean that successful campaigns
can significantly increase membership lists and donations. MoveOn.org
is the best illustration of this phenomenon, but hardly the only one. A
wide rage of interest groups seek free media and other forms of Internetdriven publicity (e.g., coverage in blogs) when they initiate a public
comment campaign. Large public comment outpourings also may work
as delay and litigation tactics, as well as congressional wake-up calls to
revisit an issue. These are only a few of the many reasons for the proliferation of duplicative, insubstantial electronic postcards that federal
officials speak dismissively of as insubstantial “awareness” campaigns.
Some groups believe that overwhelming an agency like the Forest
Service with form letters will result in a favorable outcome. Devotees to
one or the other side in the battle over the Roadless Conservation Area
rulemaking might, at this late date, wonder whether all the spilled ink
and clicked send buttons have actually been efficacious in the face of
mountains of litigation that keep the rule in the courts. While these campaigns are presumed to be largely ineffective because they generate little new information, in some instances (e.g., the EPA’s Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Definition of U.S. Waters, or the
USDA’s organic rulemaking, where about 100,000 unique comments
carried weight with officials and influenced the final rule), it does at
least appear to contribute to an outcome favorable to the mass mailers.
The organizational incentives combined with occasional claims of victory suggest the practice is likely to dominate the near future of electronic rulemaking.
CURRENT RESEARCH ACTIVITY
On January 20, 2004, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking titled “Proposed National
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Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.”1 In response, the agency received approximately 490,000 public comments.2 An EPA press release
dated December 15, 2003, had then Administrator Mike Leavitt predicting the proposed actions would be “the largest air pollution reductions
of any kind not specifically mandated by Congress.”3 Precisely what
Congress mandated remains a matter of considerable legal debate.
Like many significant federal regulatory actions, the EPA’s Clean
Air Mercury Rule resulted from a drawn out mix of congressional, administrative, and legal proceedings stretching back to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) Amendments of 1990. A lawsuit by the Natural Resources Defense Council filed in 1992 and another by the Sierra Club in 1994 were
settled later in 1994 and ultimately resulted in a “Mercury Study Report
to Congress” (RTC), which was released in December, 1997.4 In the
EPA’s RTC, it was estimated that “about three times as much mercury
is being added to the global reservoir from U.S. sources as is being deposited from it.”
On December 14, 2000, one day after Al Gore conceded the 2000
election, outgoing EPA Administrator Carol Browner announced a
finding that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate coal- and oilfired electric utilities under Section 112 of the CAA. Section 112 requires that industry limit hazardous air pollutants using the maximum
achievable control technology. On March 15, 2005, acting EPA Administrator Steve Johnson signed the final “Clean Air Mercury Rule,” noting the United States was “the first nation in the world to address this
remaining source of mercury pollution.”5 The new rule set out a “cap
and trade” system, modeled on earlier success with reductions in acid
rain-causing sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.6 According to the EPA,
the program was designed to reduce mercury emissions from coal from
coal-fired power plants by 70% in the year 2018.7 Johnson’s press release argued that while airborne mercury was indeed a matter of great
concern, particularly for women of child-bearing ages, the United
States as a whole is responsible for only 3% of the global human-caused
emissions, and the utilities themselves produce only 1% of global humancaused mercury emissions.
And yet the health and environmental impacts of mercury in the
United States are substantial. In 2003, the EPA reported “48 states, the
District of Columbia and American Samoa issued 3,094 fish advisories, 280 more than the previous year. With these additions, 35% of the
total lake acres and 24% of the river miles in the nation are now under
advisory.”8
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On May 18, 2005, in what might be termed a (quite clearly Democratic) state coalition legal strategy, Attorneys General of nine states
and an Environmental Protection Secretary from a tenth state, joined
with New Jersey Attorney General Peter Harvey filing suit in the DC
Circuit Court to block the Bush administration rule.9 Harvey’s New
Jersey Department of Justice news release was widely quoted in the
press with the Attorney General asserting the new rules were “deeply
flawed and contrary both to science and the law.”10 In the announcement of their joint lawsuit, the coalition filing suit noted the rule will
“delay meaningful emission reductions for many years and perpetuate
hot spots of local mercury deposition, posing a grave threat to the health
of children.” In addition, a dozen national and regional environmental
and conservation organizations are collaborating on a total of four separate lawsuits in federal courts, arguing mercury hot spots will disproportionately impact individual communities.11
Advocates of more stringent controls in the press were on guard as a
result of a tendentious rulemaking process marked by irregularities. For
example, a report by the EPA’s Inspector General found senior agency
officials manipulated data and scientific studies to reach a predetermined pro-industry outcome.12 A General Accountability Office report
called the EPA’s economic analysis “of limited use,” listing among its
four major shortcomings the failure to “estimate the economic benefits
directly related to decreased mercury emissions.”13
After the final rule promulgation, editorial pages across the United
States expressed rueful dismay or else fully lambasted the Bush Administration on substantive and procedural grounds. Editorial writers at The
Boston Globe, having learned that an EPA-commissioned Harvard
study estimating health benefits of an alternative proposal at 100 times
the level used by the EPA was “stripped from public documents,”
opined that the agency “cooked the books to arrive at its weak rule.”14
At The Baltimore Sun, the editorial page put it even more baldly: “President Bush doesn’t like regulations, doesn’t like treaties and doesn’t like
scientific research that contradicts his views. The result could be a record crop of brain-damaged babies.”15 The Portland Press Herald reminded readers that a Los Angeles Times investigation revealed the
proposed rule used verbatim language from industry sources, concluding the “way these rules were developed is nothing short of laughable.”16 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel wrote the rules “could well be
a tragedy,” whereas the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette decried the “porous
plan” as a “new but not unexpected approach” likely to leave regions
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like southwestern Pennsylvania saddled with the ill-effects of toxic
mercury hot spots.17
Data and Methodology
In August 2004, the EPA provided the author with 536,975 text files
presumed at that time to be the entire population of public comments
submitted via e-mail in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.18
A random sample of 1,000 documents was selected for systematic qualitative data analysis. Five graduate student coders and a project manager
were trained by an outside consultant and the author to complete the
coding at the University of Pittsburgh during the fall of 2004.
At the beginning of each file, e-mail header text was present that was
not going to be coded. A small shell script was written by the graduate
student project manager and run in UNIX to remove all header text
lines. Once all header text lines were removed, a small macro was recorded to remove all unnecessary hard returns from the text files, rendering them more amenable to analysis using ATLAS.ti, a qualitative
data analysis software application capable of handling large scale projects with multiple coders.19
Document Division
The goal of the document division was to divide the 1,000 documents
among the five coders so that the file number sequences were mixed in a
way that decreased potential problems of similarity due to sequential
order. The documents were divided in a way that they overlapped 50%,
ensuring that the overlapped document for each coder was coded by two
other coders (see Table 1). Sixty documents were used for each round of
coding. Fifteen of each 60 documents were coded by a second coder and
another 15 were coded by a third student allowing a systematic test of
the inter-rater reliability (see section 2.4). Hence, a total of 320 documents were coded twice while 680 were coded only once.
Using an off-the-shelf qualitative research software package, ATLAS.
ti, the coders completed the first round of coding extremely quickly.
This was due to a large percentage of exact duplicate form letters (discussed further in section 3.2) and the brevity of the unique additions to
form letters. Some coders completed the first set of 60 documents within
an hour and a half. Students were trained to identify passages of text that
corresponded with one or more predetermined codes (applied at the sentence, multi-sentence, or paragraph level) and families (applied at the
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TABLE 1. Sample of Document Division Strategy for Inter-Rater Reliability
Tests
Coder

Document IDs

Overlap

Coded By

Unique Documents

Pitt1

01-60

01-15, 46-60

Pitt5, Pitt2

16-45

Pitt2

46-105

46-60, 91-105

Pitt1, Pitt3

61-90

Pitt3

91-150

91-105, 136-150

Pitt2, Pitt4

106-135

Pitt4

136-195

136-150, 181-195

Pitt3, Pitt5

151-180

Pitt5

01-15, 181-225

01-15, 181-195

Pitt1, Pitt4

196-225

document level). Appendix A presents the complete code and families
list with definitions.
Once the first round of coding was complete, the project manager conducted an analysis to verify whether codes and families were added appropriately. Examining random documents from each user, it was evident
that all of the coders lacked a clear understanding of at least some of the
code definitions, their proper application, and the best routine for ensuring that every applicable code and family designation was assigned.
Based on an analysis of the error, a supplementary training document was
created consisting of screen shots and textual analysis of where codes
were not used or inappropriately assigned. The coders reviewed the document to see where they and their peers diverged in the application of the
coding strategy. After each coder completed the review, they received a
second round of 60 documents. Three of the five coders completed four
rounds where the other two coders completed five rounds.
Upon completion of enough rounds of coding to finish the sample of
1,000 documents, two data sets were created. The first contained the
680 documents that had been coded by a single coder, the second contained 320 pairs of identical documents that had been coded by two coders. A second review stage of the second set of overlapping documents
revealed persistent inconsistencies in the coding. The coders had the
most difficulty with the codes “Comment on a Comment,” “Information
in Docket,” “Stakeholder,” “Stock Phrase,” and “Strength High.” The
coders also failed to assign the appropriate document-level families.
After a thorough review, a third re-training session was conducted to
clear up lingering confusion about codes and families.
Following the re-training, the coders returned to their assigned documents and reviewed their coding, independently correcting their mistakes,
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and adding codes and families where they were missing. Each coder’s
set of documents was subsequently reviewed by at least two other coders for omissions before a final master data set was created.
Inter-Rater Reliability
Tools for reviewing and coding text, such as those found in a qualitative data analysis package like ATLAS.ti, carry with them no particular
attributes of reliability. Using computers does not make the coding itself reliable. It is better to speak of the reliability of the results from a
particular set of observations, rather than the tool itself, the coding system, or its developers. The benefits of using ATLAS.ti are nonetheless
significant. It allows for scalable, replicable, transparent, and multicoder passes over substantial quantities of text, with significant opportunities for collaborative learning via the pre-test methods discussed
earlier, as well as the possibility of systematic tests of rater reliability
once the disaggregated coding has been merged together.
Empirical researchers once assumed that “direct observation of behavior was by definition bias-free and valid” (Suen & Ary, 1989, 100).
Current research methods assume bias and error and seek evidentiarybased claims about the reliability of observational data. The goal is to
show consistency in results over numerous repetitions or, better still,
through independent observations.
Statistical techniques have been developed to assess the reliability
of such observations. The psychometric and statistical literature refers
to inter-rater and inter-observer measures interchangeably. According
to Suen and Ary (1989, 103), agreement is a measure of “the extent to
which two or more observers agree on the occurrences and non-occurrences of a behavior.” In this study, the behavior being observed consists of the use of one or more rhetorical strategies for influencing rule
writers at the EPA.
A number of different techniques have been developed, including the
percentage agreement index, the occurrence and nonoccurrence agreement index, and the kappa coefficient (von Eye & Mun, 2005). Studies
in the area of child development and psychology in the late 1970s
showed that the percentage agreement statistic, which was, at the time,
an easy to calculate yet highly controversial statistic, was also the most
popular technique for reporting inter-rater reliability (Suen & Ary,
1989). Critics raised concerns about spurious inflation due to chance,
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while proponents defended the technique as “parsimonious both in concept and in computational procedures” (108). It is computed as follows:
Percentage Agreement ( p) =

Number of Agreements ( n )
n + Number of Disagreements

Over recent years, “coded corpora have acquired an increasing importance in almost every aspect of human language technology,” (Di
Eugenio, 2000: 441) as well as in a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary research efforts. The ongoing collaboration with the computer
science research community called for a more precise reliability metric,
as well as a tool for generating it easily and at various points in the
project. Cohen’s (1960) kappa coefficient is widely considered a better
standard measure of the degree of agreement existing beyond chance
alone across a wide range of annotation efforts. The general equation for
kappa is:
k=

po - pe
1 - pe

where po is the observed proportion agreement and pe is the expected proportion agreement by chance (Suen & Ary, 1989; Sim & Wright, 2005).
For our work on public comment discourse analysis, a useful annotation analysis tool was developed and deployed on the Web by a graduate
student computer science researcher and a programmer at The University of Southern California, Information Sciences Institute (USC-ISI).20
The tool is for reporting the kappa coefficient and agreement index
scores between two sets of annotations on a single set of documents.
The kappa coefficients presented in this paper are based on only the
coded output of an ATLAS.ti project. These scores do not reflect computations incorporating the full corpus of text, including that which received no codes, which is an alternative method for computing kappa
we are exploring. The terms that follow explain the output reported in
Tables 2 and 3:
• Exact Match: Indicates the raw number of times both coders identified identical text segment spans (with not a single character or
white space of variation) and assigned the same code. At the time
of the original coding, the kappa tool had not yet been built and the
need for high precision in text spans was less well understood.
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• Overlap: Indicates the raw number of times when matching codes
were applied to text segment spans that overlap but do not have exact boundary matches.
• Kappa: An index with a range ⫺1.0-1.0 that measures agreement
when both coders do or do not apply a code. A positive kappa indicates that observers agree more than they would by chance. A
score of 0.8 or higher is considered a high level of agreement,
whereas above 0.6 is considered substantial agreement (Landis &
Koch, 1977; Krippendorf, 1980). Any such heuristic, however,
may “oversimplify the interpretation of the values of kappa” (Suen &
Ary, 1989: 113). Some statisticians argue you need to consider the
cost of reaching wrong conclusions. Personal experience with this
tool indicates it is a dubious indicator for specific codes when the
raw counts are only a small portion of the coded text.
• F-measure: An alternate index with a range ⫺1.0-1.0 that is proving
more useful for reporting inter-rater reliability. When comparing
two coder’s annotations, the F-measure regards one set of annotations
as the correct answer and the other as the coding system output. The
equation, therefore assumes P is equal to (match)/(total number for
coder 1) and R is equal to (match)/(total number for coder 2), allowing us to calculate an F-measure as (P * R * 2)/(P ⫹ R).
TABLE 2. Aggregated Kappa Coefficient and F-Measures for Major Codes
Code
Disappointment
Economic
External
authority
Legal
Proposal
Public health
and safety
Science and
technology
Social values
Stakeholder
Unique text
(“Form⫹”)
Total

UCSUR
1

UCSUR Exact Overlap Kappa κ (w/ F-Measure F-Measure
2
Match
(w/overlap)
(κ) overlap)

77

78

26

15

0.66

0.75

0.34

0.53

62
35

88
68

20
9

24
10

0.63
0.72

0.78
0.78

0.27
0.17

0.59
0.37

33
115
151

53
185
216

5
27
65

9
37
60

0.75
0.18
0.21

0.80
0.39
0.57

0.12
0.18
0.35

0.33
0.43
0.68

92

144

23

25

0.37

0.51

0.19

0.41

125
19
72

153
28
68

53
5
49

49
13
13

0.43
0.88
0.86

0.73
0.96
0.95

0.38
0.21
0.70

0.73
0.77
0.89

781

1081

282

255

0.57

0.72

0.30

0.58
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TABLE 3. Kappa Coefficients and F-Measures for Sub-Coding of “Unique Text
from Form Letters”
Code

UCSUR UCSUR Exact Overlap Kappa
F-Measure F-Measure
κ
8
9
Match
(w/overlap)
(κ) (w/overlap)

Agency
mission

51

42

38

0

0.82

0.82

0.82

0.82

Anecdotes

45

24

23

0

0.76

0.76

0.67

0.67

Catering to
business

55

45

38

2

0.75

0.79

0.76

0.80

Children’s
health

86

81

75

5

0.82

0.93

0.90

0.96

Disbelief

35

20

16

1

0.76

0.78

0.58

0.62

Economic

14

36

9

2

0.67

0.71

0.36

0.44

Higher
values

33

10

5

0

0.66

0.66

0.23

0.23

Insults

27

32

21

0

0.82

0.82

0.71

0.71

Public
interest/
health

121

59

50

7

0.18

0.29

0.56

0.63

Sarcasm

13

12

5

1

0.85

0.85

0.40

0.48

Science

5

11

5

0

0.94

0.94

0.62

0.62

Shame

44

8

8

0

0.63

0.63

0.31

0.31

Substantive
claim

24

0

0

0

0.75

0.75

0.00

0.00

Toxics

39

25

20

4

0.75

0.83

0.62

0.75

Total

595

405

313

22

0.73

0.76

0.63

0.67

In this study, 320 of the original sample of 1,000 e-mails had two
sets of annotations. Under the document division strategy outlined in
Table 1, a unique set of two of the five Pitt coders were responsible for
each pair of double-coded documents. To generate the overall kappa coefficient and F-measures, the annotation “Author” (Pitt1-5) was changed
to UCSUR 1 for one set of 320 completed documents and to UCSUR 2
for the other set. Hence, Table 2 aggregates all measures of inter-rater
reliability between the five coders over the full set of 320 double-coded
documents.
Less frequently applied codes were removed from the project prior to
generating the ATLAS.ti report (“All Quotations”) on which Tables 2
and 3 are based. The rationale behind this decision is that, in those instances, the number of observations of so-called minor codes was so
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few that the “agreement” of non-observations resulted in extremely
high kappa coefficients. To produce a table with summary totals undistorted by inflated scores on the minor codes, these codes were deleted
from a duplicate version of the project and then the report was generated
for analysis using the USC-ISI kappa tool.
For the purposes of this study, two observations stand out. First, for a
number of the codes that were applied frequently enough to produce
valid inter-rater reliability scores (including overlaps), there is significant agreement. The iterative process of revisiting the coding definitions and examples of mismatch along the way resulted in solid coding
of concepts such as “Social Values,” “Stakeholder,” and “Public Health
and Safety.” Second, and more relevant to the focus of this paper, the
inter-rater reliability measures for the code “Unique Text in a Form
Letter” were 0.95 (kappa including overlap) and 0.89 (F-measure including overlap). Therefore, in our study of 1,000 e-mails, the Pitt graduate
student coders were fairly reliable when it came to isolating unique additions to form letters.21
INITIAL FINDINGS
At this early stage in the research (and in the epoch of mass e-mail
campaigns) there are few indications that online deliberation is enhanced within the current e-government configuration in the United
States. The mass e-mail campaign in particular appears to be an odd and
possibly counter-productive tribute to twentieth century notions of onedirectional, non-deliberative, and un-reflexive nose counting. Although
the medium could be used to promote better dialogue, debate, deliberation, and public understanding, it falls short of the loftier ideals held out
by hopeful political theorists.
E-Mail Is Not a Good Medium for Deliberative Acts,
Such as Comments on Other Comments Already Submitted,
or Respect for Different Points of View
If one is looking for indications of online deliberation, it simply does
not happen via e-mail, at least not in this particular rulemaking. The
code designed to capture deliberative behavior, “Comment on a Comment,” was applied only once. The one instance in 1,000 documents
of this code was: “You already have the boilerplate info from other
letters, which I won’t repeat here. Be assured, I DO SHARE THOSE

56

JOURNAL OF E-GOVERNMENT

CONCERNS.” This commenter went on to write a comment that included several of the most important stock phrases from form letters and
nothing original.
Looking back, it should have been more obvious at the outset that e-mail
clients and Web advocacy services are not set up to promote reflection on,
or responses to, comments from people with whom the commenter disagrees. The architecture of e-mail is structurally ill-suited for deliberation about the merits of a proposed rule. When a user of a Web advocacy
form is constructing their unique addition to a form letter (which is
delivered as an e-mail), the response is not to the actual proposed rule
published in the Federal Register nor the reasoned claims of the other
side. Rather, it is almost exclusively to the appeals and imagery of the
advocacy campaign organizers.
Perhaps the only real possibility for finding any significant quantity
of actual online deliberative behavior might be a sample drawn only
from people who commented from inside an actual web-based system
(such as EPA’s E-Docket), or some other system that fits the architectural definition of an open docket. The net effect, at least in the mercury
case, seems to be the rendering of e-mail as a de facto medium for engaging in perfunctory assaults on the logic, science, competence, values, and virtues of the agency and the administration overall.
The Ability to Amend Form Letters Generated via Web
Advocacy Campaigns Results in Very Few Substantial Additions
to Pre-Formulated Awareness Campaign Text
Each of the documents was assigned to one or more families, such as
exact duplicate, near duplicate (which are modified form letters), suspected duplicate, or off-topic (see Appendix B). A total of 67 documents were determined to be off-topic. Of these 67 off-topic files, most
were comments on a different rule handled by the EPA’s Office of Air
and Radiation and a small number were commercial spam. After the completion of the document and coding merge, suspected duplicates were
reviewed and assigned a proper family status by the author and all of the
off-topic documents were permanently removed from the data set.
Among the 933 files that remained, 740 files (79.3%) were coded as
exact duplicates generated by electronic advocacy campaigns. The only
variations in these files were the submission dates and the commenters’
personal identification data. Another 182 files (19.5%) were determined to be modified form letters, in which the commenter had added at
least one sentence to a body of text that was otherwise duplicative.
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Hence, according to the coding, a total of 922 of 933 e-mails in the sample (98.8%) were generated by electronic form letter campaigns.
The average length of the unique additions to form letters was approximately 38 words, or about the length of one very short paragraph.
The following empirical section of this paper focuses on just those 182
unique additions to form letters that have come to be known as the “⫹”
in “form ⫹” letters. Having had the coders identify 182 “form ⫹” letters
in our sample of 1,000 e-mails, the complete “⫹” content was then subcoded by two different, independent coders using thematic categories
created by the author after his review of the 182 instances of unique text.
Several inter-related themes and very few substantive comments, by
agency standards, were identified.
The quantitative totals in Table 4 report the instances of quotations
assigned to a code by one or both of the coders engaged in the subcoding of this text. The author reviewed and verified every instance of
the form ⫹ sub-coding; a number of quotations were “unlinked” when it
was determined a code had been applied in error or as a result of a misjudgment. Hence, the quantitative data presented in Table 4 resulted
from the author adjudicating disputes between the two independent subcoders (UCSUR 8 & 9).
TABLE 4. Independent and Final Adjudicated Counts
Code Name

UCSUR 8

UCSUR 9

Final

Agency mission

51

42

47

Anecdotes

45

24

36

Catering to business

55

45

51

Children’s health

86

81

82

Disbelief

35

20

34

Economic

14

36

38

Higher values

33

10

32

Insults

27

32

30

121

59

104

Sarcasm

13

12

18

Science

5

11

4

Shame

44

8

22

Substantive claim

24

0

8

Toxics

39

25

35

Total

592

405

541

Public interest/health
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Mass E-Mail Campaigns May Do More Harm than Good
if They Make It Harder to Find the Useful Comments or Lower
the Estimation of the Public Role in the Minds of Regulators
Even if there are a few more substantive (though not deliberative)
comments in the mix, (and based on the mercury sample, perhaps less
than 5% of every addition to a form letter may be substantive), the more
the volume increases the more likely that anything good submitted will
be lost under the current sorting regime, which consists of hiring for
profit contractors and manually identifying “unique comments” by eye
while looking at the printed version. Based on this preliminary exploration of the mercury sample, for every brief but substantive comment
tacked on to a form letter e-mail, a reviewer will also have to read at
least 90-95 pithy, pleading, condescending, name calling, or otherwise
useless comments. It may therefore do more harm than good when hastily typed. Unreflective tirades are the bulk of the comments and they
drown out the people whose carefully drawn comments might actually
make a difference.
CONCLUSION
After a review of the data, it is difficult to be anything but cynical
regarding the viability of finding deliberation in the current age of erulemaking. The rub is this: Whether for good or bad, the current system
means that old-fashioned rules of thumb, like the 20-page rule, or the
letterhead rule, are effective filters for officials who say they know in
advance what they will need to read and what it will say. While the occasional lone voice speaks to us about the thrill of finding a gem in
amongst a large number of duplicative thoughts, the agencies mostly
farm that analytical work out to contractors and focus on what conventionally is known to matter. No doubt the best intentions of emotive,
pleadings citizens will continue to result in floods of redundant comments; e-mail is a boon for generating those.
We in the e-rulemaking research group do not all reach the same conclusions about what is observable so far, neither in the data nor the responses of various actors involved. We are not without some shared
hope, however, that innovation both at the federal level and in the NGO
and e-advocacy sectors will eventually result in more meaningful online
deliberation in controversial rulemakings. One can imagine deployment
of more creative uses of IT by the groups to engage their members in
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innovative, IT-enhanced efforts to distill the wisdom of the collective.
For example, interest groups could retain their ability to mine the participants for data while getting 10, or 20, or even 50,000 people broken up
into small groups that brainstorm, deliberate, and distill, then the groups
aggregate into larger clusters of groups, then clusters of clusters, who all
along can visualize via the Web, the best ideas, examples, and stories as
they rise to the top. With a highly interactive goal in mind, you can
imagine all sorts of Meetup.com style engagement add-ons and other
innovative tools, like those developed by the “PICOLA” project at Carnegie Mellon University22 and Beth Noveck’s “Cairns” project at the
New York Law School.23 There are a number of possibilities about how
this might emerge over time, yet to date, they remain largely the dreams
of theorists who reside outside the beltway and whose work is at least
one step removed from the actual rulemaking battleground.
NOTES
1. See Federal Register Vol. 69, No. 20 pp. 4652-4752 (available at: http://snipurl.
com/dab9).
2. The EPA reports it “initially received over 680,000 letters, e-mails and postcards, including almost 5,000 unique messages, commenting on the Proposed Clean
Air Mercury Rule and the Supplemental Clean Air Mercury Rule by the time the public
comment period ended on June 29, 2004. As of February 2005, EPA E-Docket shows
an actual count of more than 490,000 public comments and close to 4,500 unique comments received. The initial count of 680,000 and 5,000 included duplicate and triplicate
e-mails and comments related to other rules.” See: http://snipurl.com/dabd
3. See: http://snipurl.com/f13z
4. See: http://www.epa.gov/mercury/report.htm
5. See: http://snipurl.com/f146
6. See: http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/capandtrade/index.html
7. The Natural Resources Defense Council disputes the claim, insisting the EPA’s
new rule will attain only a 50% reduction by 2020. See: http://snipurl.com/fuir. Under
a cap and trade system, the total amount of mercury emissions declines nationally,
however plants can either innovate to reduce their emissions or purchase excess credits
in a quasi-market mechanism.
8. See: http://snipurl.com/f1l6
9. See: http://snipurl.com/fuis. The other states were: California, Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
and Wisconsin.
10. Michelle O’Donnell, “11 States Challenge Break on Mercury for Coal Power
Plants,” New York Times (May 19, 2005).
11. See the joint environmental interest group press release at: http://snipurl.com/
fuiu.
12. Shankar Vedantam, “EPA Inspector Finds Mercury Proposal Tainted,” Washington Post (February 4, 2005), A4. Also see: http://snipurl.com/fuiv
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13. The GAO report is online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05252.pdf.
14. Editorial, “Retrograde on Mercury,” Boston Globe (April 1, 2005), A1.
15. Editorial, “Thumb on the Scale,” The Baltimore Sun (March 25, 2005), 14A.
16. Editorial, “EPA’s Mercury Rules are Just One Symptom of a Greater Problem,”
Portland Press Herald (March 30, 2005), A9.
17. Editorial, “Mercury Rule Too Weak,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (March 28,
2005). Editorial, “Toxic Decision,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (March 17, 2005), A14.
18. The full population of mercury e-mail is available for research purposes along
with 11 other public comment text data sets at the e-rulemaking Testbed hosted by
Carnegie Mellon University at: http://hartford.lti.cs.cmu.edu/eRulemaking/Data.html
19. In this and other data and project management tasks, as well as the writing of the
first draft of sections 2.2 and 2.3, the work of Graduate Student Researcher Ahmed
Shaffi was indispensable.
20. Many thanks to ISI’s Namhee Kwon, a student of Dr. Eduard Hovy, who built
the tool, and to Lei Ding, a staff programmer, who made it available on the Web at:
http://www.isi.edu/~nkwon/eRule/kappa.html. This unsupported, experimental tool is
available for any ATLAS.ti user who would like to review or report these inter-rater
agreement statistics. The output here is based on uploading the “All Quotations” file
from the ATLAS.ti quotation manager as plain text after the work of multiple coders
had been merged together.
21. A number of interesting observations will follow in future papers about the task
of producing more reliable coding for salient but diffuse concepts such as “Science and
Technology,” “External Authority,” “Legal,” and “Disappointment.” Other ATLAS.ti
output analysis tools currently under construction by USC-ISI personnel will allow
better and faster training that will improve the overlap, increase the number of exact
matches, and cut down single instance annotations that indicate a second coder missed
an observation. In separate ongoing studies completed after this round of coding, significantly higher inter-rater reliability scores are being reported as a result of narrowing
the number of codes in use and increasing the precision of the rule set governing the
coding process.
22. See: http://communityconnections.heinz.cmu.edu/picola/index.html
23. See: http://www.nyls.edu/pages/2150.asp
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APPENDIX A
Original Mercury Code List (Including Minor Codes)
• Comment on a Comment: Text that refers to another comment submitted during the public comment process.
• Comment on a Position: Text that refers to a position held by an
NGO, group, or citizen, BUT NOT explicitly noted as found
within the docket.
• Difficult to Code: Text that seems not to fit anywhere, but which
also seems significant, or which in some way blurs the boundaries
between existing codes.
• Disappointment: Text that reflects the disappointment in current
or future government decisions.
• Disrespect: Text in which the substance or tone of the comment
demonstrates disrespect for another position, person, group, or
comment.
• Doomsayer: Text that argues in the “worst case scenario” mode.
• Economic: Text that uses an economic rationale to make a claim.
• Expertise: Text that invokes an earned right to call oneself an expert (e.g., an advanced degree or job training).
• External Authority: Text that gives as a reason for holding an opinion that it is the view of some authority such as a trusted person, organization, religion, science, etc.
• Good Quote: Text that is demonstrative of the meaning of a code,
the nature of the process, or which is otherwise just so interesting
or funny.
• Information in Docket (not comments): Text reflecting that the
commenter has read, and is responding to specific information in
the docket BUT NOT another comment.
• Legal: Text that cites a legal basis to make a claim.
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• Personal Experience: Text that invokes personal knowledge, experience, or narrative as the basis for a claim.
• Proposal: Text that makes a suggestion for a specific new policy
or change in an existing policy.
• Public Health and Safety: Text shows concern for public health
and/or safety.
• Science and Technology: Text that points to scientific or technical
knowledge.
• Social Values: Text that invokes social values to make a claim.
• Suspicion-Corruption: Text that reveals a commenter is suspicious of one or more aspects/actors in the rulemaking.
• Trust: Text that reflects the presence of trust in government to
make decisions.
• Unique Text in a Form Letter: Text that is suspected of being
added-on to a standard form letter.
APPENDIX B
Mercury Families (Document Level)
• Exact Duplicate: A document that is exactly like another document, with only date, header, or signature variation.
• Near Duplicate: A document that is like another document, but
with unique text added.
• Suspected Duplicate: A document that appears to be a duplicate,
but the coder cannot locate a match in their bundle.
• Off-Topic: A document that is for another rulemaking, spam, or
otherwise off the topic of the proposed mercury regulation.

